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2An Experimental Study On Real-Option Strategies
Abstract
We conduct a laboratory experiment to study whether people in-
tuitively use real-option strategies in a dynamic investment setting.
The participants were asked to play the role of an oil manager and
make production decisions in response to a simulated mean-reverting
oil price. Using cluster analysis, participants can be classified into four
groups which we label as “mean-reverting,” “Brownian motion real-
option,” “Brownian motion myopic real-option,” and “ambiguous.”
We find two behavioral biases in the strategies of our participants:
ignorance the mean-reverting process, and myopic behavior. Both
lead to overly frequent switches when compared with the theoretical
benchmark. We also find that the last group behaved as if they had
learned to incorporate the true underlying process into their decisions,
and had improved their decisions during the later stage.
Keywords: Real Options, Experimental Economics, Heterogeneity.
JEL classification: C91, D84, G11
31 Introduction
In many capital budgeting scenarios, managers have the possibility to make
strategic changes, such as postponement and abandonment, during the life of
the project. A typical example is that of an oil company who may decide to
temporarily shut down production when the oil price falls below the extrac-
tion cost, yet decide to start operation as soon as the oil price rises above the
extraction cost. This happened during the Gulf war when several oil fields in
Texas and Southern California began operations when the oil price increased
sufficiently enough to cover the relatively high extraction cost (Harvey 1999).
Strategic options such as that above are known as real options because the
real investment can be seen as coupled with a put or call option. Real-option
research is one of the most fruitful fields in finance. Compared with the
traditional Net Present Value (NPV) approach that offers an all-or-nothing
answer to the investment decision, the real-option method takes advantage
of wait-and-see and reacts strategically when uncertainty evolves over time.
Investors can cut off unfavorable outcomes by considering the options of
abandonment, deferment, switching. As a result, the real-option approach
can substantially increase the value of a project, when compared with the
less flexible NPV approach.
Complicated methods have been developed to evaluate a variety of real
options. Yet, in reality, people can still make different kinds of mistakes by
applying the model incorrectly, or misunderstanding the real-option nature
of a particular project.Therefore it is crucial to know whether the real-option
approach makes intuitive sense to investors, and if not, what are the possi-
ble pitfalls. For example, in the U.S. and other countries, the government
regularly auctions off leases for offshore petroleum tracts of land. The oil
company has to bid hundreds of millions of dollars on such tracts, thus it is
important to perform valuations as accurately as possible. Given the magni-
tude of the stakes of such an investment, even a tiny valuation mistake may
cause large financial losses. But as observed by Dixit & Pindyck (1994), even
the government can arrive at valuations which are too low, if they apply the
NPV instead of the real-option method.
Despite extensive theoretical work on real-option modeling, empirical
testing of real options has nonetheless been scarce. In particular, we know
very little about how people in the real world (e.g., managers) actually value
real options more than at an anecdotal level. It is mainly due to the intrin-
sic difficulties in obtaining reliable data on components of the real-option
approach, such as the current and future value of an underlying asset, and
the investor’s expectations of future cash flows. Previous empirical studies of
real options often use either estimations or proxies for these input parameters
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(e.g., Quigg, 1993). Such problems may be circumvented by using surveys or
well-controlled experiments.
In this paper, we report a laboratory experiment on real-option decisions.
Our participants were asked to imagine they are oil-field managers. The ex-
periment lasts 100 periods. At the beginning of each period, the participants
observed the oil price in a simulated market and had to decide on production
technologies. Depending on the current status, they could decide whether to
keep the current level of production, to increase or decrease the production by
using different technologies, or to shut down the production temporally. All
changes at the production level incur switching costs. A real-option strategy
in this scenario would take into account the flexibility of investment decisions
and switch less often than a NPV strategy. If we assume that the output
price follows a Brownian motion process, then real-option strategies suggest
that one should change less often towards the end of the game as switching
costs would not compensate the expected potential profits.
The underlying process of output prices also has important implications
regarding optimal strategies. For example, if the underlying price follows a
mean-reverting process, then it can happen that both the NPV and the real-
option strategy predict no or few changes of technologies. We will discuss
the difference between the various processes in later sections.
The main contribution of this paper is that it is the first exploratory study
on the heterogeneity of intuitive real-option strategies in a continuous-time
setting. The underlying stochastic process of output price is determined by
the experimenter. The real-option strategies can be calculated under different
assumptions of the price process and risk attitude. The models are flexible
enough to fit the observed behavior, and to accommodate different types of
investors.
The advantage of using an experimental method is that we can control
the underlying price process and compute the optimal investment strategies
based on various theoretical assumptions. The behavior of the participants
can then be compared with theoretical benchmarks, and we can identify
different groups based on their implicit strategies. Using cluster analysis, we
identify four typical strategies used by the participants, labeled as “Mean-
reverting,” “Brownian motion real-option,” “Brownian motion myopic real-
option,” and “ambiguous.”
Only nine out of our 66 participants belong to the “mean-reverting” group
who changed least often and earned the highest average profit among all four
groups. Our calculation shows that when assuming a mean-reverting price
process, it is optimal to stay at the current production level, regardless of
whether one applies a real-option or NPV strategy. “Wait-and-see” has the
highest value in this case.
5Twelve participants are clustered into the “Brownian motion real-option”
group. The modal behavior of this group resembles a real-option strategy
when assuming a Brownian motion price process and risk aversion. Investors
switch to high-production technology when the price is sufficiently high and
shut down production when the price is too low. During the later periods,
however, it is no longer worth switching as potential profits are limited.
The biggest group in our cluster analysis is labeled the “Brownian motion
myopic real-option” group, and contains nearly half of the participants (29
out of 66). They behave as if they follow a real-option strategy assuming
a Brownian motion process with risk-aversion, yet without considering the
limited time horizon of the game. In other words, they play as if the game
would last forever and thus change too frequently at the end of the game.
The strategies of the remaining 16 participants are rather ambiguous.
During the first 67 steps, their strategies are more similar to real-option
strategies with a Brownian motion process, whereas during the last 33 steps,
their switching behavior fits best with the NPV or real option strategy under
the assumption of a mean-reverting process.
It seems that the majority of our participants play as if they believe
in a Brownian motion process, whereas the true process we used in this
experiment is a mean-reverting process. A natural question to be asked
is how the price process perceived by the participants? For each period
we therefore elicited the participant’s price expectation for the next period.
Interestingly, it seems that the perceived process is more similar to a mean-
reverting underlying price process. However, most participants behave as if
they are not aware of this process, or do not incorporate this information
into their decisions.
Some theorists observe that the intuitive investment decisions by man-
agers are closer to real option strategies than the traditional NPV strategy
(Dixit & Pindyck 1994). Our results seem to support this observation as the
NPV strategy does not capture the behavior of most participants. However,
we find two typical behavioral biases from our participants. First, many
participants do not take into account the finite time horizon and switch too
often at the end of the game thereby reducing their earned profits. Second,
although many participants expect a mean-reverting price process, they re-
act to the price movement as if the price followed a random walk leading to
overly frequent switches.
Despite certain behavioral biases, some participants demonstrate a spe-
cific kind of learning effect during the experiment. Two ways of learning are
possible. The first way of learning is to increasingly behave according to the
real-option strategies over time. The behavior of the “Brownian motion real-
option” group, for example, fits better with the corresponding strategies at
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later stages of the experiment. The second way of learning is to perceive the
true underlying mean-reverting process, and to incorporate this process into
decision making. The last group (i.e.,”ambiguous” strategy), for example,
behaves as if they have learned to incorporate the mean-reverting process
into decisions made during the later stage.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows: in the second section
we review the relevant literature on empirical and experimental real-option
studies. In the third section we outline the theoretical framework behind our
experimental design. The fourth section describes the experiment procedure
and the results. In the last section we discuss the theoretical and practical
implications of our study.
2 Literature Review
Before the formal introduction of the theoretical real-option technique, many
corporate managers and strategists dealt with the ideas of managerial flex-
ibility and strategic interactions on an intuitive basis. Dean (1951), Hayes
& Abernathy (1980) as well as Hayes & Garvin (1982) recognized that the
standard Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) criteria often undervalue investment
opportunities. This would lead to myopic decisions, underinvestment and
eventual losses of competitive positions because important strategic con-
siderations are either ignored or not properly valued. Myers (1977) first
proposed the idea of thinking of discretionary investment opportunities as
growth options. Kester (1984) discussed the strategic and competitive as-
pects of growth opportunities from a conceptual point of view. Other gen-
eral aspects of real-option framework have been developed by Mason & Mer-
ton (1985), Trigeorgis & Mason (1987), Trigeorgis (1988), Brealey & Myers
(1991), Kulatilaka (1988) and Kulatilaka (1992). More specific applications
of the real-option framework to various investment problems include real es-
tate development (Titman 1985, Williams 1991), lease contracts (Schallheim
& McConnell 1983, Grenadier 1995), oil exploration (Paddock, Siegel &
Smith 1988), and research and development (Dasgupta & Stiglitz 1980).
To our knowledge, there are very few experimental studies on real options.
The findings are somewhat mixed regarding whether people’s intuition is con-
sistent with the real-option theory. For example, there is evidence that the
subjects make less irreversible investment now if they expect more informa-
tion about the risky asset to surface in the future (Rauchs & Willinger 1996).
Howell & Ja¨gle (1997) asked managers to make hypothetical decisions on in-
vestment case studies in the context of growth options. In their setting, after
a fixed period of time, it is possible to invest in a follow-up project. Several
7factors in the Black-Scholes model, such as Present Value, volatility and time
to maturity, have been varied to investigate whether respondents could intu-
itively apply a real-option approach. Although it seems that the respondents
did not hold the simplistic NPV view for valuation, their decisions were not
perfectly in line with the real-option theory, neither. Both under- and over-
valuations occur. It has also been observed that factors such as industry,
sector, personal experience and position influence valuations. Interestingly,
more experienced managers were more likely to overvalue the projects, prob-
ably due to overoptimism. In general, the respondents behavior cannot be
described by one model due to the existant heterogeneity.
Another notable experimental study is from Yavas & Sirmans (2005),
who applied a simple two-stage investment setting to test for optimal tim-
ing by the subjects. They also measured the premium associated with the
real-option components of an investment and examined how this premium
is correlated with uncertainty about future cash flows from the investment.
Their results again provide mixed evidence regarding the descriptive validity
of real-option theory. On the one hand, most subjects seemed to be too opti-
mistic and entered the project too early when compared with the theoretical
optimal timing. On the other hand, in the bidding experiment, their bids for
the right to invest in a project were generally close to the theoretical level,
and reflected the value of the real option embedded in the project. Moreover,
the bidding behavior of the participants was consistent with the option pric-
ing theory, which predicts that greater uncertainty about future cash flows
increases the value of the project.
An interesting phenomenon in the Yavas & Sirmans (2005) experiment is
the learning effect. At the beginning, the bids were too optimistic and hence
too high, which is consistent with the typical observation that inexperienced
investors tend to be more aggressive and optimistic. The price, however, con-
verges with the theoretical predictions as their experience increased. There
was also evidence that some subjects, with experience, learned to postpone
their investment decisions in order to make more optimal decisions.
In an option pricing experiment, Abbink & Rockenbach (2006) found that
students with technical training in option pricing were better at exploiting
arbitrage opportunities than professional traders and students without formal
training. Miller & Shapira (2004) have used hypothetical questions on real
option pricing and identified certain biases that are consistent with behavioral
decision theory.
While the above studies are among the first empirical tests of option pric-
ing theory, their set-ups are relatively simple. Subjects typically only make
decisions over no more than three periods. Although simplified tasks help
to disentangle confounding factors, it is not clear whether one can gener-
8 3 THEORETICAL MODEL
alize the results to the more realistic context. This motivates us to start
an experiment on real-option investment in a highly dynamic environment,
which is more complicated but also more realistic. Consistent with previous
observations, we find real-option strategies seem to be more intuitive than
the NPV approach, but that people differ very much in their strategies. We
can categorize the subjects into four typical types. The behavior of some
groups is consistent with some previous findings such as the learning effect
and myopic behavior.
3 Theoretical Model
As a starting point, we established the theoretical framework for an oil-
manager investment game in which players are supposed to choose among
various oil-production technologies in a dynamic market setting in order to
maximize their profits. In our setting, it is assumed that the exploration
and development of the oil field have been completed, and the manager only
encounters the decisions during the extraction stage. We have designed the
exogenous underlying price process, and solved the optimal strategies as well
as the optimal timing, accordingly.
3.1 NPV vs. Real Options
Since for each period, players can make production decisions as a response to
the current market price, the situation is comparable to a series of American
call-options that can be exercised any time before the expiration date. The
real-option approach can be applied in this scenario and is different from the
traditional NPV approach in that it has the advantage of waiting. When us-
ing NPV as the criterion to evaluate the investment opportunity, one should
invest immediately as long as the project has a positive Net Present Value. In
comparison, the real-option theory prescribes that it is sometimes better to
wait until uncertainty regarding future cash flows is resolved. We calculated
the optimal timing and the investment strategies for both the NPV and the
real-option approach as our theoretical benchmarks, as explained below.
3.2 Geometric Brownian Motion Process
Geometric Brownian motion is among the most common continuous-time
stochastic processes to model prices. A stochastic process Pt is said to follow
a Geometric Brownian motion if it satisfies the following equation:
dPt = µPtdt+ σPtdWt (1)
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where {Wt, t ≥ 0} is a Wiener process or Brownian motion, and the
constant parameter σ represents variance or volatility. In our setting, the
drift µ is equal to zero. The increments in P , i.e., ∆P/P , are normally dis-
tributed, which means that absolute changes in P , i.e., ∆P , are lognormally
distributed, which is why the process has the name “geometric.”
The following set defines the possible critical prices Scrit where it is rea-
sonable to change the technology (see Appendix A for the proof):
￿− αIT−u +QoldCold −QnewCnew
Qold −Qnew
￿￿￿u ∈ [t, T ],α ≥ 1￿ (2)
where Q denotes the quantity of production (e.g., the number of barrels
of oil produced), and C denotes the cost per unit (e.g., cost per barrel). The
subscript old refers to the adopted technology at a given time period t. The
subscript new stands for all possible technologies other than the status quo.
The numerator is a sum of two parts: the first part is the investment cost
I multiplied by a factor α and divided by the remaining time steps T − t,
in which T is the number of total periods and t is the current period; the
second part is the difference between the total production cost of the old and
new technology. The denominator is the difference in production quantity
between the current technology and the alternative technology.
The real option strategy takes into account future uncertainty and reeval-
uates the investment cost. That is, the investment cost I is multiplied by
parameter α, which reflects to which extent to the investor considers the
future uncertainty. The larger the α, the longer the player waits before
switching. When α = 1, it is equivalent to the NPV strategy. When α > 1,
it corresponds to a possible real-option strategy.
Figure 1 suggests such boundary solutions for a Geometric Brownian mo-
tion process. It shows the fluctuating price process and the switching bound-
aries that symbolize the critical price Scrit, where it is rational to switch from
one production condition to another. The left panel indicates the solution
for the NPV strategy α = 1 and the right panel shows the boundaries for
the optimal real option strategy with α = 30. Compared to the real-option
strategy, it is clear that the NPV strategy boundaries are much narrower,
triggering more frequent switches between production levels.
In our experimental setting, when assuming a Geometric Brownian pro-
cess, a player would change technologies 38 times according to the NPV
approach. It would cost $12,300 for technology changes, which almost offset
the gross profit of $14,071, resulting in a net profit of $1,771. In comparison,
if an investor adopts the optimal real option strategy with α = 30, which
theoretically leads to maximum profits, then one only needs to change tech-
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nologies 17 times. The net profit increases from $1,771 to $4,689, due to the
reduction of switching costs.
Figure 1: Switching boundaries for an NPV strategy(α = 1, left panel) and a
real-option strategy (α = 30, right panel) with a Geometric Brownian Motion
price process:
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Y.
Another characteristic of the boundaries for the NPV strategy is that they
are almost flat for the first ninety periods, and only spread at the very end.
This means that players should stop switching around the last ten periods
as switching costs are too high compared to the limited expected profits.
In comparison, the boundaries for the real-option strategy spread out even
earlier, implying that it is optimal to stop switching during the second half
of the game.
3.3 Risk Aversion and Mean Reversion
We now look at the boundary solutions for the more realistic assumptions,
namely risk-averse attitude and mean-reverting process. Most real-option
models assume investors are risk-neutral, but in reality most investors are
risk-averse. We can assume an exponential utility to capture the degree of
risk-aversion as follows:
u(x) = cecx (3)
where c is the risk-aversion coefficient. Figure 2 shows a typical expo-
nential utility function with c = −0.0002, which seems to fit the behavior of
some types of our participants, as we will show later.
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Figure 2: Exponential utility function (c = −0.0002)
Moreover, although a Geometric Brownian motion as described above is
frequently used to model economic and financial variables such as interest
rates and security prices, one may argue that it is more likely that in practice
oil prices follow a mean-reverting price. As Lund (1993) points out, Geomet-
ric Brownian motion is hardly an equilibrium price process. The reason for
this is that when prices rise, there are incentives for existing firms to increase
production and for new firms to enter the market. The natural consequence
is that the larger supply would slow down the price increase ultimately caus-
ing prices to decline. The same logic applies in the case of price decrease.
Therefore, at the market level, a mean-reverting process is a more plausible
process for oil prices and has been supported by some empirical tests (see
e.g., Pindyck & Rubinfeld (1991)).
In our experiment, a mean-reverting process is used to model the stochas-
tic behavior of the continuous-time oil prices. The oil price P at time t is:
Pt = P
D
t e
k(− Q
tot
t
Q
max,tot
h,t
+0.5)
(4)
The above pricing process has two components, a mean-reverting com-
ponent and an exponential one. The first component PDt follows a mean-
reverting, or Orstein-Uhlenbeck process with:
dPDt = h(µ− PDt )dt+ σdWt (5)
where Wt (for t ≥ 0) is a Wiener process or Brownian motion, µ is the long-
run mean of PDt , h is the speed of adjustment, and σ models the volatility
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of the process. In our experiment, µ = 61.5, h = 0.5, σ = 9.07, and k = 0.
The second component in Equation 4 – the exponential function – models
the supply side. The fraction in the exponent measures production, which is
the ratio between realized industry production (Qtott ) and maximum industry
production where all firms had chosen technology with the highest capacity
(Qmax,tott ). The fraction has a co-domain of [0,1]. k is a constant factor that
determines the impact of the exponential on PDt . It is a proxy for the market
size of the managed oil fields relative to the total market size. The higher
the k, the bigger the impact of supply on price. When k = 0, the oil price
Pt is determined independent of the oil production decisions by the market
participants, which is the case in our experiment.
Figure 3: Switching boundaries for NPV strategy with a mean-reverting
price process (Left panel: all 100 time steps; Right panel: step 70 to 100)
c=-0.0002:
Switching Boundaries for a Mean 
Reverting Model, !=1
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
400
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Time Step
Pr
ic
e 
Le
ve
l
Price
A -> B
B -> A
B -> 0
0 -> B
0 -> A
A -> 0
Switching Boundaries for a Mean 
Reverting Model, !=1
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
70 80 90
Time Step
Pr
ic
e 
Le
ve
l
Price
A -> B
B -> A
B -> 0
0 -> B
0 -> A
A -> 0
Notes: The left panel shows the boundary solutions for the entire session (period 1 ∼ 100).
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denotes switching from production X to production Y.
Appendix A provides the proof for the boundary solutions. Figure 3
shows the switching boundaries of an NPV strategy (i.e., α = 1) for the
mean-reverting price process. The left panel shows the switching boundaries
for all 100 time periods, whereas the right panel shows the boundaries for the
last 30 periods, so that one can see in more detail the boundaries towards
the end. The boundaries become narrower over time but spread at the very
end (the right panel). Indeed, with a mean-reverting process there are fewer
incentives to change technology as the process is expected to revert to its
equilibrium level and the expected profit generated by a change of technology
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could be negative. However, as time goes by, if the speed of adjustment is
not too fast, the realized profit could be substantial as the price is expected
to be much higher than the equilibrium level at maturity. Finally, when
close to maturity, the sunk cost generated by a switch of technology is not
compensated by possible profit. The boundaries spread at the very end as
it does not make sense to change technology at that time. For any prices
between the two boundaries B→ A and B→ 0 the expected price will rapidly
converge towards the mean price. For the mean price, technology B is the
most profitable strategy, even for an NPV strategy (α = 1). For this reason,
in our setting one should never change production technologies if he/she
assumes a mean-reverting process, regardless of whether he/she adopts an
NPV or a real-option strategy.
3.4 Brownian Motion (BM)
When the speed of adjustment h is equal to 0 in Equation 5, the process
is consistent with a Brownian motion process. It can be considered to be a
continuous-time version of a random walk. It has the Markov property in that
the past pattern of prices has no forecasting value, often referred to as “the
weak form of market efficiency.” It is based on the theoretical assumption
that all public information is quickly incorporated into the current price and
hence, no investors can “beat the market.”
Compared with the mean-reverting processes, the decision rules for Brow-
nian motions are more explicit and intuitive. In principle, investors should
start or increase production when the price rises above some threshold, and
stop or reduce production when the price falls sufficiently. Figure 4 shows
the boundaries for NPV and a real option strategy when c = −0.0002 in the
exponential utility function (Equation 3). See Appendix A for the proof.
4 Experiment
4.1 Participants and Procedure
In total seventy-one undergraduate students from the University of Zurich
in Switzerland participated the experiment in June 2007. The subjects were
recruited from classes in economics or finance. In the experiment, they were
asked to play the role of an oil-field manager and to run the oil field to
maximize profits. For this purpose, they had to produce and sell oil in a
simulated market. Their earnings were based on the oil price, which was
generated from a mean-reverting Markov process specified in Equation 4
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Figure 4: Switching boundaries for real-option strategy with a Brownian price
process and risk-aversion attitudes (c=-0.0002) (Left panel: NPV α = 1;
Right panel: Real Option α = 30):
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Notes: “A” denotes technology A, the technology with high production level and high
cost; “B” denotes technology B, the technology with low production level and low cost;
“0” denotes no production. “X → Y” denotes switching from production X to production
Y.
and Equation 5 in the section of theoretical models. The price process is
exogenous and the players are price takers, since we are mainly interested
in investors’ strategies, not market equilibrium. The experimental session
lasted 100 periods. Each period represents one business day and is divided
into 10 sub-steps simulating the development of the oil price during the day.
For simplicity, the oil cannot be reserved for the following periods, and all oil
produced is automatically sold at the end of each period. The players were
asked to choose from two production technologies for the next period: (1)
Technology A has a higher production level (50 barrels per day) and higher
cost ($611 per barrel); (2) Technology B has a lower production level (25
barrels per day) and lower cost ($58 per barrel). Alternatively, a player could
also choose to disinvest or shut down production, resulting in zero production
level. Switching between different technologies, or switching from zero level
to a new technology costs $350 each time, whereas switching between existing
technology and disinvestment costs $300 each time. The whole experiment
took about one hour and included an introduction, an experimental and a
questionnaire session. The average earnings per participant was 33.50 CHF
(SD=12.90 CHF).
The simulation also generated messages about the incoming price move-
ment. There are three treatments regarding incoming messages: (1) Filtered
information: participants only received messages that are relevant to the
1The symbol $ here represents experimental currency.
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price movement; (2) Full information: participants received a mixture of
relevant and irrelevant messages regarding the price movement; (3) No infor-
mation: participants received no information.
4.2 Classification of participants based on strategies
As the data for five participants were excluded due to invalid answers, there
were 66 participants in the final analysis. In order to classify participants
based on their switching decisions, we ran a two-step cluster analysis for all
participants with all 100 periods. A two-step cluster method is a scalable
cluster analysis algorithm to handle very large data sets. Unlike the K-
means or hierarchical clustering, the two-step cluster method can handle
both continuous and categorical variables. In our case, since the decision
variables are categorical variables, the two-step cluster method is the only
appropriate method. The log-likelihood distance measure and BIC criterion
were used to detect the optimal number of clusters. The cluster analysis
revealed four homogenous subgroups which can be compared with candidate
theoretical strategies.
Now let us look at the matching rate with the candidatel strategies for
each subgroup in Table 1. Each column represents one of the six potential
strategies that have been discussed in the theoretical section, while each row
represents one of the four types of investors from the cluster analysis. We
compare the modal behavior of each cluster with the theoretical strategies.
The matching rate is defined as the percentage of decisions which coincides
with the theoretical strategies for all 100 periods. It seems that the first
group matches very well (matching rate=0.94) with a NPV or real-option
strategy when assuming a mean-reverting process.2 We label this group as
“mean-reverting.” The second group matches best with the optimal real-
option strategy under the Brownian motion process with risk-averse attitude
(matching rate=0.87). Thus they are labeled as “Brownian motion real-
option.” The third group, labeled as “Brownian motion myopic real-option,”
fits best with a myopic real-option strategy with risk-averse attitude. The
last group is most similar to the NPV strategy with a Geometric Brownian
motion process. However, later we will see that the last group behaves as if
they changed the perceived price process from Brownian motion to a mean-
reverting process. So it seems that this group did not follow a consistent
strategy. Accordingly, we label them as “ambiguous .” We explain these
four strategies in more detail below.
2Note that when assuming the mean-reverting process, both NPV and real-option
strategies would prescribe no changes and staying in Technology B. See discussion in
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Table 1: Matching rates for each group with different strategies
Risk-averse attitude
N Geo. Brownian Mean-revert. Brownian motion
Group NPV RO RO/NPV NPV RO RO myopic
1. Mean-reverting 9 0.47 0.08 0.94 0.26 0.08 0.08
2. BM Risk-averse RO 12 0.39 0.71 0.08 0.53 0.87 0.73
3. BM Myopic RO 29 0.46 0.73 0.07 0.55 0.67 0.75
4. Ambiguous 16 0.58 0.49 0.45 0.49 0.50 0.50
Note: RO means Real Options and NPV means Net Present Value. Each row represents
one of the four classified groups. Each column represents the potential strategies.
Matching rate is the percentage of decisions that coincides with the theoretical strategies
for all 100 periods for each group. For example, in the first row, 0.86 means that on
average there are 86 out of 100 periods in which the decisions by participants in the
mean-reverting group coincide with the theoretical predictions of NPV/Real option
strategy for the mean-reverting price process.The bold fonts represent the highest
matching rate among all theoretical strategies for a given group.
Figure 5 shows the majority behavior for each classified group as com-
pared with the predicted decisions of the corresponding theoretical strate-
gies. In the first row, the left panel shows the majority behavior for the
“mean-reverting” group. Most of the time, technology B (low production
technology) is chosen and coincides with the theoretical NPV or real option
strategies when assuming the mean-reverting process (the right panel of the
first row in Figure 5).
In the second row of Figure 5, the left panel shows that the majority
of the second group, the so-called “Brownian motion real-option” group,
switches between high production technology (Technology A) and no pro-
duction during the first half of the game, but chooses the high production
strategy (Technology A) during the second half of the game. This behav-
ior pattern is very similar to a real-option strategy with α = 30 under the
assumption of Brownian motion price process and risk-aversion exponential
utility function with the risk coefficient c=-0.0002 (see the right panel in the
second row).
The majority behavior of the third group is shown in the left panel of
the third row of Figure 5. As we can see from the graph, most of the time
the participants switch between high production technology (Technology A)
and no production. This behavior is similar to the second group during the
the theoretical section.
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first half of the experiment. The difference is that the second group stops
switching during the second half of the game, whereas the third group still
keeps changing technologies, which is not optimal due to the high switching
costs. This group behaves as if they do not consider the limited horizon of the
game, and plays as if the game would last forever without a potential profits
limit. In this case, the theoretical switching boundaries are not sensitive to
the termination date and remain flat until the last period. They play as
if they have adopted a “myopic real-option” strategy assuming a Brownian
motion process.
The last group switches among both high production technology, low
production technology, and no production (the left panel of the last row of
Figure 5). In the last 10∼15 periods, low production technology is chosen
and no more switching occurs. This behavior is to some extent similar to a
NPV strategy under a Geometric Brownian motion process. We label this
group as “ambiguous”, because participants do not play consistently with
one strategy. In contrast, they seem to learn the underlying price process
and change their strategies over time. This will again be discussed in the
section on the learning effect.
In summary, the behavior of the first two groups was closest to the ratio-
nal real-option strategy under different assumptions of price process (mean-
reverting vs. Brownian motions). The last two groups employed less optimal
strategies thereby differentiating themselves from the first two groups in that
they kept switching technologies towards the end of the game. The third
group behaved myopically without considering the termination of the game.
Although it was not consistent in its strategies, the last group, behaved as
if it had learned the true underlying mean-reverting prices process. Table 2
shows that the first two groups switched less often than the last two groups,
which corresponds to the theoretical predictions. Accordingly, the first group
(“mean-reverting”) earned the highest profit on average, followed by the sec-
ond group (“Brownian motion real-option”). The last two groups (“Brownian
motion myopic real-option” and “ambiguous”) earned much lower profits.
4.3 Learning
In the above we analyzed the matching rates for the whole experiment for
all 100 periods. Yet, it may be that the participants learned to play more
optimally over time. We divided the 100 periods into three windows – periods
1-33, 34-67, and 68-100. Figure 6 shows that in some cases the matching rates
indeed change dramatically over time. Decisions made by the second group
match the “Brownian motion real option” strategy by approximately 80%
for the first 33 periods, with the matching rate increasing to approximately
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Figure 5: Classifying participants into four groups and the corresponding
theoretical strategies
Experimental behaviour Theoretical prediction
Mean-reverting N=9
30
40
50
60
70
80
1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91
Time Step
Pr
ic
e
Decision
Price
0 
B
A
Mean Reverting, / Brownian Motion with high !
Risk averse (c=-0.0002), No Change, Profit=$9979
30
40
50
60
70
80
1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91
Time Step
Pr
ic
e
Decision
Price
0 
B
A
Brownian Motion Real Option N=12
30
40
50
60
70
80
1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91
Time Step
Pr
ic
e
Decision
Price
0 
B
A
Brownian Motion, Real option (! = 30), Risk averse 
(c = -0.0002), 
10 Changes, Profit=$5982
30
40
50
60
70
80
1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91
Time Step
Pr
ic
e
Decision
Price
0 
B
A
Brownian Motion Myopic Real Option N=29
30
40
50
60
70
80
1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91
Time Step
Pr
ic
e
Decision
Price
0 
B
A
Myopic Brownian Motion, Real option (! = 30),  
risk-averse (c = -0.0002)
22 Changes,  Profit= $2555
30
40
50
60
70
80
1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91
Time Step
Pr
ic
e
Decision
Price
0 
B
A
Ambiguous, N=16
30
40
50
60
70
80
1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91
Time Step
Pr
ic
e
Decision
Price
0 
B
A
Geometric Brownian Motion, NPV (! = 1)
37 Changes, Profit=$2311
30
40
50
60
70
80
1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91
Time Step
Pr
ic
e
Decision
Price
0 
B
A
4.4 Expectations and decisions 19
Table 2: Switching frequencies and average profits by each group
Switching Frequencies Mean Profit ($)
Theoretical In experiment Theoretical In experiment
Group N prediction Mean(SD) prediction Mean(SD)
Mean-reverting 9 0 9 (6.6) 9979 7076 (1909)
Brownian motion RO 12 10 10 (6.0) 5982 4750 (2383)
Brownian motion myopic RO 29 22 21 (5.3) 2555 3924 (2390)
Ambiguous 16 37 20 (9.6) 2311 3211 (2863)
95% for the last 33 periods. We can say, therefore, that this group appears
to have learned to choose optimal strategies as time went on.
The group with an “ambiguous” strategy matches best with the real
options strategy with Brownian or Geometric Brownian motion. However, in
the last period, the matching rate of these two strategies drops sharply, and
there is a dramatic increase in the matching rate of strategies with a mean-
reverting process. They behaved as if they had identified the true underlying
process, and had incorporated this information into their decisions later in
the game.
The biggest group, the “Brownian motion myopic real-option” group, co-
incides best with the myopic real option strategy, without significant differ-
ences across three time windows. This group switched between technologies
until the end of the game, which is non-optimal.
4.4 Expectations and decisions
Although the true underlying price process in our experiment was a mean-
reverting process, the participants may have different perceptions. During
the experiment, for each period we asked participants about their expecta-
tions regarding the price movement in the next period, which allowed us to
check the expected price process.
Figure 7 compares the price prediction with past period prices for all
four groups. It is interesting to see that all four groups perceived some kind
of mean-reverting underlying price process– when the price in the previous
period is high (low), they expected the price to go down (up) in the next
period. For the middle-range prices, they expected little change in the next
period.
This is puzzling because according to our comparisons with the theoretical
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Figure 6: Matching strategies over time for four groups
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strategies, most participants behaved “as if” they believed in a Brownian
motion price process, but they seemed to perceive a mean-reverting process
based on our elicitation of their expectations. In other words, they somehow
expected the future price to revert to the average price, but they did not
incorporate this information into their decisions. Instead, the participants
switched production technologies as an immediate response to market price
fluctuation. Figure 8 shows that in general, for high prices, they tended to
use high production technology; for medium prices, they tended to use low
production technology. When prices were sufficiently low, they tended to
close down production. This contradicts the normative point of view. If
investors believed the price would revert to some mean price, they should
have waited more and should not have changed technologies so often, since
potential profits would be too low to compensate switching costs.
4.5 Impact of information
In this section, we would like to examine the impact of information on price
perception, strategies, and profits. Figure 9 shows the range of past period
price as compared to price prediction for different information conditions.
As expected, the group with no information perceives the price process to
be close to a Brownian motion process, whereas the groups with filtered
information and unfiltered information perceive the price to be closer to the
true price process (mean-reverting process).
No significant differences were found between the group with filtered in-
formation vs. the group with unfiltered information. Therefore, we pooled
these two groups with information, and compared them with the group with-
out information. Figure 10 shows that the subjects with information were
more likely to choose more profitable strategies, and belong to the “mean-
reverting” and “Brownian motion real-option” groups. On the contrary, sub-
jects without information were more likely to be classified into the last two
groups (“Brownian motion myopic real-option” and “ambiguous”), who fol-
lowed less optimal strategies. As a result, the group with information earned
significantly higher profits than the group without information. Yet, there
is no significant difference in switching frequencies between the group with
information and the group without information(see Table 3).
5 Conclusion
This paper reports an laboratory experiment to test how people intuitively
handle option-like investment. It can be seen as an extension of previous
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Figure 7: Price prediction vs. past price for all four groups
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Figure 8: Production decision vs. past period price for all four groups
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Note: The difference between full information and filtered information conditions is not
significant. Therefore we pool these two groups and label it as ”with information.”
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Table 3: Switching frequencies and profits by information treatment
Information treatment With information Without information
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) t-statistic p
Switching frequencies 15 (9.3) 19(7.0) -1.52 0.13
Profit ($) 5168 (2714) 3583 (2676) 2.38 0.02
N 35 32
Note: The difference between full information and filtered information conditions is not
significant. Therefore we pool these two groups and label it as ”with information.”
experimental studies on real options, e.g., Yavas & Sirmans (2005), Miller
& Shapira (2004) and Howell & Ja¨gle (1997). We use a continuous-time
setting which more closely resembles how decisions are made in the real world.
Although we did not recruit real managers for our tasks, our student subjects
had mostly with economic or finance backgrounds, and were very interested
in such management tasks. In a questionnaire at the end of the experiment,
most participants indicated that they found the experiment interesting, and
they also indicated maximizing payoffs is one of their main goals. Therefore,
we believe the students were well motivated.
Although many people may believe managers and professionals are ratio-
nal and can perform better than students and laymen, numerous empirical
studies show that professionals also prone to various kinds of behavioral
biases, e.g., Cadsby & Maynes (1998), Gort, Wang & Siegrist (2008), She-
frin (2007). It was also found in laboratory experiments that professional
traders even perform worse than university students in the option pricing
tasks (Abbink & Rockenbach 2006), and CEOs’ behaved similarly to un-
dergraduates in the bubble experiments (Ackert & Church 2001), etc. The
behavioral biases found in our experiment, therefore, may not be unique
only for undergraduate samples. The experimental and empirical studies are
complementary in the sense that the observed behavior from well-controlled
experiments offers us guidance regarding what kinds of behavioral biases we
should look for when studying real-world decisions. The further step is to
compare the behavioral patterns revealed in our experiment with the real-
options investment behavior by professionals, and to study the implications
of such biases on option pricing at the aggregate level through theoretical
modeling.
Different types of investment behavior among players were identified using
cluster analysis. We found that some participants’ behavior closely resem-
bled optimal real-option strategies, whereas others exhibited certain typi-
26 5 CONCLUSION
cal behavior biases. This is consistent with the general findings on “typ-
ing” heterogeneous behavior in dynamic decision problems. For example, in
their experiment on Bayesian learning, El-Gamal & Grether (1995) identi-
fied Bayesians, conservative Bayesians, and those who used the representative
heuristic. Houser, Keane & McCab (2004) classified their participants into
“Nearly rational,” “Fatalist,” and “Confused.” Our results can shed light
on understanding intuitive strategies people may adopt when it comes to
real-option investment.
The first behavioral bias we noticed is the ignorance of a mean-reverting
process. We elicited price expectation for each period, and it seems that
most subjects believe in a mean-reverting price process. However, they did
not incorporate this expectation into their decisions, and hence switched tech-
nologies as if they believed in a Brownian motion process, i.e., the expected
future price is the same as the current price. Accordingly, they switched too
often as compared with the theoretical benchmark when assuming a mean-
reverting process. Although it is extremely difficult to determine the true
process in reality, ignoring mean-reversion may undervalue the value of a
project (Dixit & Pindyck 1994). In particular, not being able to incorporate
the expected price process into decision making, as was the case among our
participants, may be a more general behavioral bias that deserves further
investigation.
Another bias we found is the insensitivity to the termination date. Nearly
half of our participants played as if the game would last forever. They kept
switching technologies till the end of the experiment, a strategy which would
not pay off due to the high switching cost and low, limited expected profits.
However, some participants seemed to learn over time. There are two
ways of learning in this game. One can learn to adopt a real-option approach
while still assuming the Brownian motion process. Another possibility is
to learn the true underlying mean-reverting process and incorporate this
information into the decision making. We found the “Brownian motion real-
option” group seemed to belong to the first case, whereas the “ambiguous”
group seemed to learn in the second way. Future research should investigate
how investors learn from their experience, and which conditions may help
them learn faster.
In general, it seems that the real-option approach with a Brownian motion
process makes more intuitive sense to most participants than the NPV ap-
proach, even though they leaned toward certain kinds of biases as described
above. It is important to document the heterogeneity and understand which
factors can cause such different behavior, an under-explored topic. Our study
takes one further step in this direction, and we are planning more in-depth
research on developing descriptive real-option theory, in order to understand
27
how managers learn, how they value information, and how they react to
competition.
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A Proof of Boundary Conditions
A.1 Geometric Brownian Motion
In the case of Geometric Brownian Motion, the dynamics of oil prices are
given by:
dPu
Pu
= σdWu
where the constant parameter σ represents volatility. In this setting, the
drift is equal to zero. The discount rate is the constant parameter r.
A.1.1 NPV approach
The expectation of the discounted profit Πt corresponding to a switch in
technology at time t (from the old one to a new one) is:
EP(Πt|Ft) = (EP
￿ ￿ T
t
Pue
−r(u−t)du
￿￿￿Ft￿− Cnew(T − t))Qnew − I
where I represents the switching cost, from the old to the new technology, i.e.
EP(Πt|Ft) = (EP
￿
Pt
￿ T
t
e−r(u−t)e−
−σ2
2 (u−t)+σ(Wu−Wt)du
￿￿￿Ft￿−Cnew(T−t))Qnew−I
The experiment lasts only a few hours, therefore we assume that the interest
rate r is equal to zero. In order to approximate the exercise boundary, we
assume that the new technology will be kept until maturity T.
P represents historical probability. The following result is obtained:
EP(Πt|Ft) = Qnew(T − t)(Pt − Cnew)− I
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In order to obtain the critical price P ∗, the expected discounted profit, in the
case of technology change, has to be compared with the expected discounted
profit if the firm keeps the old technology. Thus, this critical price satisfies
the following equation:
Qnew(T − t)(P ∗t − Cnew)− I = Qold(T − t)(P ∗t − Cold)
and expression 2 is obtained, with α = 1. This case corresponds to the NPV
approach.
A.1.2 The real option approach
In this setting, the players will wait longer before switching. Therefore we
obtain a set of possible exercise boundaries:
￿− αIT−u +QoldCold −QnewCnew
Qold −Qnew
￿￿￿u ∈ [t, T ],α ≥ 1￿
which corresponds to expression 2. In order to derive the optimal parameter
α∗, we rely on a Monte-Carlo simulation. The price process is simulated n
times and we look for α which maximizes the average realized profit.
A.2 The Mean-Reverting process
In this case, we focus on an Orstein-Uhlenbeck process. The dynamics of oil
prices are therefore given by:
dPt = h(µ− Pt)dt+ σdWt
We work with the following utility function:
U(x) = cecx
where c is a negative parameter.
The expected utility of the profit Πt corresponding to a switch in technology
at time t is:
EP(U(Πt)|Ft)
where:
Πt = Qnew
￿￿ T
t
Pudu− Cnew(T − t)
￿
− I
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Therefore:
EP(U(Πt)|Ft) = EP(ecQnew
R T
t Pudu|Ft)× e−cCnewQnew(T−t) × e−cI
= ecQnewM(t,T )+
c2
2 Q
2
newV (t,T ) × e−cCnewQnew(T−t) × e−cI
with:
M(t, T ) = µ(T − t) + (Pt − µ)(1− e
−h(T−t)
h
)
V (t, T ) = − σ
2
2h3
(1− e−h(T−t))2 + σ
2
h2
(T − t− 1− e
−h(T−t)
h
)
Indeed,
￿ T
t Pudu is a normally distributed random variable with meanM(t, T )
and variance V (t, T ).
In order to obtain the exercise boundary, the expected utility of the profit
with the new and the old technology has to be compared. P ∗t is the solution
of the following equation:
ecQnewM(t,T )+
c2
2 Q
2
newV (t,T )e−cCnewQnew(T−t)−cI =
= ecQoldM(t,T )+
c2
2 Q
2
oldV (t,T )e−cColdQold(T−t)
i.e.
(Qold−Qnew)M(t, T ) = − c
2
(Q2old−Q2new)V (t, T )+(T−t)(QoldCold−QnewCnew)−I
(Qold −Qnew)(Pt − µ)(1− e
−h(T−t)
h
) = − c
2
(Q2old −Q2new)V (t, T )−
− I + (T − t)(QoldCold −QnewCnew)−
− (Qold −Qnew)µ(T − t)
i.e.
P ∗t =µ+
h
1− e−h(T−t)
￿
− c
2
(Q2old −Q2new)V (t, T )− I+
+ (QoldCold −QnewCnew)(T − t)− (Qold −Qnew)µ(T − t)
￿￿
(Qold −Qnew)
In the real option setting, there is a set of possible exercise boundaries:￿
µ+
h
1− e−h(T−t)
￿
− c
2
(Q2old −Q2new)V (t, T )− αI+
+ (QoldCold −QnewCnew)(T − t)− (Qold −Qnew)µ(T − t)
￿￿
(Qold −Qnew), u ∈ [t, T ],α ≥ 1
￿
The exercise boundary corresponds to the value of α which maximizes the
average realized profit. The NPV case is obtained for α = 1.
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A.3 The Brownian motion
In this case the dynamics of the underlying are given by:
dPt = σdWt
The exercise boundary is obtained by letting h go to zero in the last equation.
By relying on a Taylor expansion, we obtain the following set of possible
exercise boundaries:￿
(QoldCold −QnewCnew)− αIT−u − c3(Q2old −Q2new)σ2(T − t)2
Qold −Qnew
￿￿￿u ∈ [t, T ],α ≥ 1￿
B Instruction sheet of the Experiment
Introduction
• This experiment investigates human behavior in the midst of uncer-
tainty. The participants are rewarded according to their achievements.
• During the experiment, it is not allowed to communicate with other
participants or to look at their screens.
• The experiment is to be processed to the full extent.
• If the participant does not follow the above rules, he or she will be
disqualified from the experiment and not receive pay.
The structure of the experiment
• You play the role of the oil company manager and choose the technology
which allows you to extract a certain quantity of oil and later sell it on
the market.
• Each time period in the experiment corresponds to one day on the oil
market. Overall, the experiment lasts 100 days.
• Every day you observe the price on the oil market. In the evening, after
the market has closed, you will first be asked about your expectations
regarding tomorrow. Only then can you decide on your production
setup for the next day.
• You begin with the starting capital of $3,000. If you go bankrupt, you
will be fired and may no longer participate in the experiment. The
higher wealth you achieved, the more you get paid.
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Name Cost per barrel Production
per day
Technology A $61.00 50 Barrel
Technology B $58.00 25 Barrel
• You can choose between 2 technologies with the following parameters:
• Every technology change incurs switching costs. A technology change
costs $350, a production stop costs $300. If you start producing again
with the same technology, you need to pay $300, if you change tech-
nology after the stop, you need to pay $350 for it.
Switching costs from A to B or from B
to A
$350
Switching costs from A to Stop or from
B to Stop
$300
Switching costs from Stop to the tech-
nology used before the Stop (e.g., A -
Stop - A)
$300
Switching costs from Stop to the tech-
nology different as one used before the
Stop (e.g., A - Stop - B)
$350
• The extracted oil is sold in the evening on the same day at the current
price on the world market. Warning: there is no link here between
reality and the experiment.
• During the game, you receive information on market trends which you
need to work out.
Handling
• At the beginning, during the first 2 introductory periods, various in-
formation will be presented as well as how to run the software.
• On the next page you will find a screenshot with the statements on the
relevant parts.
Examples of the performance calculation
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1. At the beginning of the game a player starts production with technol-
ogy A. After two periods he decides to stop production. At the end
of two periods, the price of oil is $56.40 and $62.80 respectively. The
profit is calculated as follows:
($56.4/Barrel - $61/Barrel) * 50 Barrel - $0 = -$230
($62.8/Barrel - $61/Barrel) * 50 Barrel - $0 = $90
2. The player then chooses to switch to technology B. With an oil price
of $66.40 at the 3-rd time period he/she earns:
($66.4/Barrel - $58/Barrel) * 25 Barrel - $300 = -$735
Initial wealth and pay-off calculation
• You take on the oil field with the following settings: Wealth: $3,000,
current technology: B.
• The pay-off depends on your performance. The more dollars you earn,
the more money you receive. Your profit will be calculated as follows:
Total profit = Σ profits Pt of all time periods;
Profit of a time period Pt = (Oil price - Production costs) *Number
of barrels produced - Switching costs.
• You receive a base salary of 10 CHF for your participation in the ex-
periment. For every extra dollar you earn, you get 0.5 Rappen (i.e.
$1=CHF0.005). In case of loss, you don’t have to pay anything back.
• The paid amount is rounded by CHF2.
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